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Bribes by firms in Indonesia arise principally from regulations --licenses and levies --imposed by local government 
officials. Regulations generate direct revenues (fees) plus indirect revenues in the form of bribes. The expected value of 
the latter is capitalized into lower salaries needed by localities to compensate public officials. Localities in Indonesia are 
hampered by insufficient revenues from formal tax and transfer sources to pay competitive salaries plus fund 
“demanded” levels of public services, because local tax rates are capped by the center and inter-governmental transfers 
are limited. Thus the direct and indirect revenues from local regulations are critical to local finances. The paper models 
and estimates the key aspects of corruption -- the relationship between bribes, time spent with local officials, and 
different forms of regulation. It models how inter-jurisdictional competition for firms limits the extent of local regulation 
and how greater sources of tax or inter-governmental revenues reduce the need for regulation and corruption. The paper 
estimates a large reduction in regulation in better funded localities. The findings are directly relevant to Indonesia where 
corruption is high and the country is in the throes of major decentralization and local democratization efforts.    
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Corruption in Indonesia is widespread and costly. Based on the detailed survey this paper utilizes, firms report 
spending on average over 10% of costs on bribes and over 10% of management time in “smoothing business 
operations” with local officials.  But the extent of corruption varies enormously across local jurisdictions, 
with, for example, the average of bribes to costs ranging from .56% to 31% across localities in the survey. 
This paper focuses on two issues. First we examine the nature and costs of corruption, asking how money and 
time costs vary as the local regulatory environment a firm faces varies. Second, we argue and present 
evidence that local regulatory environments depend on local fiscal arrangements and local fiscal situations, as 
determined in part by central government policy.  Localities with more restricted formal fiscal situations use 
regulations and the resulting corruption and bribes as a form of indirect taxation to help fund adequate 
compensation for local officials. This relationship is of particular interest given two key political issues in 
Indonesia today—ameliorating corruption and achieving full devolution of many governmental functions to 
localities.  
                                                 
1 This paper was written while Kuncoro was a Visiting Professor of Population Studies at Brown University, for 
which funding from the Mellon Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Gilles Duranton for helpful comments 
on an early draft of the paper. 
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In analyzing, first, the nature and costs of corruption, we ask what types of public regulations invite 
bribes (Kaufmand and Wei, 1998) and how important is each type. For regulations such as required licenses 
and levies, how does the bribing process work? What are the magnitude of bribes needed either to avoid 
requirements or to supplement official fees, and what determines the amounts of time spent wooing local 
officials? How heterogeneous are responses across firms and how predictable is this heterogeneity of 
response? Answering these questions will help us understand the extent to which creation of regulations 
enhances the ability of officials to extract bribes. We also examine forms of corruption, involving defraud of 
the state of, say, tax revenue that individual firms might favor (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).  
To examine corruption, we will utilize a data set collected in 2001-2002 by LPEM at the University 
of Indonesia covering 1808 firms in 64 (out of about 300) local government areas, which is unusual in two 
aspects. First is the detailed micro information on forms of regulations and interactions with local officials. 
Second is the high response rate – in terms of willingness to report bribes, willingness to report other 
corruption information, and candor about the magnitude of bribes paid. For example, 75% of all firms 
sampled report positive bribes, and we infer that about another 5% correctly report zero bribes. Given missing 
values on other responses, in all in our data, we work with a sample of valid bribe responses of over 70% of 
the original surveyed firms. As we will see, non-respondents on bribe payments are not a random group, with 
typically different behaviors in other corruption dimensions than respondents. In contrast, in Uganda which is 
a country viewed at least as equally corrupt (Bardhan, 1997),  Svensson (2003) ends up analyzing bribes 
reported by just 48% of original surveyed firms from a general economic survey of firms. In Svensson’s 
survey mean bribes are only about 3% of profits (and presumably a much smaller fraction of costs), in 
comparison to mean bribes to costs of 10.5% in our survey. The magnitudes reported for Uganda are similar 
to what Indonesian firms report as corruption costs (“gifts given”) in the formal Industrial Economic Census. 
But the carefully crafted interviewing for our survey specifically focused on corruption,  with various indirect 
checks on accuracy, brings out very different responses and response rates.   
In examining the second issue of how fiscal arrangements affect regulatory and corruption 
environments, the corruption most firms face involves interaction with local officials, who administer 
regulations and taxation. Thus we focus on government at the kabupaten level, which is the main local 
government institution, and is similar in geographic scope to US counties. This focus is of particular interest, 
since several months before our survey started, Indonesia implemented full decentralization of expenditure 
functions, with some degree of local democracy, moving away from a formerly more unitary, authoritarian 
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system. 2  The regime shift is expected to help curtail corruption, by increasing the role of the local 
government and accentuating the forces of inter-jurisdictional and political competition. Corruption in 
Indonesia is a major on-going political issue with wide press coverage and public discussion and has been a 
focus of both World Bank (2003) and local academic (Kuncoro, 2003) study. It is recognized that democracy 
may have a limited impact on corruption (Rasmusen and Ramseyer, 1994) and that regime switches are 
difficult given the role of history, culture, and expectations (Tirole 1996, Sah 1988, Andvig and Moene 1990, 
and Bardhan 1997).  However, as we will explain, the concern in this paper is that decentralization may 
worsen corruption overall and seems certain to worsen it in some kabupaten because, while expenditure 
functions are decentralized in the reforms, revenue functions are not.  
To understand the potential link between corruption and fiscal arrangements, for the moment think of 
the government of a kabupaten, elected or not, as being embodied in the regent (the Indonesian term for the 
head of the local government), who hires local officials to administer regulations, as well as provide services. 
While the regent has a local property tax base, de facto tax rates are capped at low levels; and fiscal transfers 
are modest. It is widely acknowledged that revenues from tax and transfer sources both before and after 
decentralization are insufficient to pay for even minimal mandated public service levels, so the regent needs 
to seek other forms of revenue. Local regulations such as licenses and “levies” provide indirect revenues in 
the form of bribes, as well as direct revenues. Bribes received by local officials to ameliorate the impact of 
regulations mean the regent can pay lower salaries to officials, freeing up money for other purposes– i.e., 
expected bribes received are capitalized into lower official salaries.  
The use of regulations and corruption to provide local revenues is not without consequence. A regent 
is aware that non-competitive levels of regulation and excessive bribe demands make his locality unattractive 
to firms, driving firms to other kabupaten. Loss of firms impinges on a kabupaten’s tax base, lowering tax and 
bribe revenues. It also may affect local economic growth, local wages, property values, and wealth of the 
regent and other residents. In a context where the last 15 years in Indonesia has seen rapid and massive 
movement of manufacturing firms out of central cities into ex-urban areas (Henderson, Nasution and 
Kuncoro, 1996), rural kabupaten that are less corrupt may compete and develop more effectively.  
The need for kabupaten to rely on regulation and corruption depends on inter-governmental fiscal 
arrangements. If the regent has access to higher effective tax rates on the kabupaten tax base or enjoys greater 
                                                 
2 Local legislators are now elected. However the local government head, or regent, is still de facto appointed by 
the center. After 2001, she became subject to censor and impeachment by the local elected parliament; and in November 
2003, new legislation was enacted to have her be directly elected as well in the future. Note regents themselves as well as 
central government officials are corrupt, perhaps inhibiting their ability to fight lower level corruption (Andvig and 
Moene, 1990).  
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inter-governmental transfers, her need to rely on corruption is reduced. The effect of decentralization on local 
government finances is still unclear; kabupaten have much greater expenditure responsibilities but also greater 
inter-governmental transfers. However it seems clear to observers that both before and after decentralization 
kabupaten governments are under-funded and that there are definite fiscal losers from decentralization. As we 
will see, in Indonesia because of oddities in the national tax-transfer system, in our data on local fiscal 
budgets, there is wide variation in the extent of fiscal transfers from the center as a fraction of local GDP, as 
well as wide variation in regulated tax revenues. We will link quantitatively the extent of regulation and local 
fiscal situations. 
 The paper starts with a conceptual framework, modeling aspects of corruption, inter-jurisdictional 
competition, and the effect of fiscal arrangements on corruption, reviewing the relevant literature as we go 
along. Next, it turns to an empirical assessment of regulation, corruption, and the interaction between firms 
and local officials. Finally, we review center-local fiscal arrangements in Indonesia and examine the effects of 
fiscal arrangements on corruption.  
 
1.  Modeling Corruption and Its Effects 
 
In this section we outline a simple model of “demand and supply” of bribes in a locality. Firms supply bribes 
in interaction with local governmental employees, under the “efficient grease” hypothesis to reduce the 
impact of regulations (e.g., Liu, 1985, and Becker and Maher, 1986, as reviewed by Bardhan, 1997). Given 
the response of firms and local government employees, local governments “demand” bribes through the 
imposition of regulations (e.g., Banerjee, 1994, Kaufman and Wei, 1998). The new ingredients we bring to 
this traditional modeling of corruption are twofold. The choice of the extent of regulation and related 
corruption by local governments is constrained by strategic competition across localities for firms. Second the 
choice to use regulation and corruption as a form of indirect taxation and compensation of local government 
employees is influenced by local fiscal situations and the access of local governments to other forms of public 
revenues. The model we outline will form the basis for the empirical study of corruption. 
2.1 Modeling Firm Response to Regulation 
How do firms respond to regulations (e.g., licenses, “levies”), or what is often called “red tape” or just 
“harassment” (Kaufman and Wei, 1999), in interacting with local officials? Bribes are supplied to ameliorate 
the impact of regulations, such as waiting times for specific licenses needed to carry out different aspects of 
business.  In thinking about the bribing process, evidence in Kaufman and Wei (1999), Svennson (2003) and 
our data suggests that bribes and firm time engaged with public officials are positively correlated. To reduce 
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the costs of regulation takes both time and money. In our data we will have six categories of the fraction of 
time spent by management with local officials smoothing operations. The mid-point values of time are 2.5%, 
10%, 20%, 37.5%, 62.5% and 87.5%. The mean percent of bribes in production costs changes across firms in 
each category, taking average values respectively of 7.8%, 9.3%, 12.5% 16.8%, 14.4% and 19.4%, so the 
average rises  by 2.5 fold moving from the lowest to highest category. 
Why this positive, rather than negative correlation? Two sets of reasons come to mind. First, based on 
common perceptions of the social forces involved, officials enjoy spending time with firms, whether it is 
because of power issues (“I can force firm i  to devote time to me”) or because the official does not want to be 
seen as a simple thief but rather wants to cultivate a “gift relationship” among “friends”. The latter seems to 
be a common perception of the bribe relationship in Indonesia. Second, as a pure economic explanation, time 
is spent trying to assess what level of bribe is needed to get cooperation of the official. In modeling, to 
simplify, we utilize a “black-box” formulation of the first notion, but note that the second can be modeled 
also. 3 
 To model bribes, we adapt Kaufman and Wei, so that later in analyzing the demand for regulations 
and bribes, we can capture the notion of inter-jurisdictional competition for firms. In doing so, we separate the 
specification of firm production technology from that of corruption technology. We start with corruption 
technology and the supply of bribes. In the model, “harassment” is for example the number of licenses, h , 
which the local government imposes. For a firm, there is a “black-box” bribing “technology” to reduce the 
effects of harassment, ( , )f b t , where effective harassment ( , ),  and ,  0,  ,  0.b t bb tth h f b t f f f f= − > <  Bribes are 
b  and time by firm management is .t  So time and bribes may be spent to reduce waiting time to get a license, 
which is required to proceed with certain firm functions. Reducing harassment involves both time and money 
                                                 
3Economic micro-foundations for the f(b,t) function below about time and bribes could involve a learning story. For any 
license and license grantor, there is a minimum payment, say ,θ  an official will accept, depending on the official’s 
“tastes”. That minimum is private information and the firm only knows the distribution. The firm gets, say, two tries 
(visits by the official to the factory), to bribe him. If he fails on both accounts, he gets no license that year and that 
imposes specific costs. Suppose ,θ  is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. The firm can offer 1θ  on the first visit 
which has a probability 1θ  of being accepted. If 1θ  is too low, no license is granted on the first visit and the official 
incurs a cost 1 1, with probability (1 ).c θ−  On the second visit the factory can offer 2 which has a probability θ     
2 1( )θ θ−  of being accepted. If it is rejected, the firm then bears a cost 2 2 2 1with probability (1 ),  where .c c cθ− >  
Optimizing with respect to 1θ  and 2θ  certain regions of parameter space yield an interior solution where 
1 1 2  2 / 3  / 3 c cθ = + and  2 2 1  2 / 3  / 3.c cθ = +  Given 2θ  > 1θ  in such a solution, time spent (number of visits) with 
the local official rises with observed bribes; and the solution also has the feature that with greedy officials bribes may 
never be paid although heavy costs 1 2( ,   and 2 visits)c c  are incurred. 
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based on the later specification of the preferences of local government employees, who administer regulations 
and collect bribes. 
For the firm, effective harassment imposes costs, ' ''( ) where ,  0.c h c c >  The firm seeks to minimize 
harassment costs plus bribes paid plus the cost of time, or 
    ( ( , ))   ( )c h f b t b w t− + +      (1) 
where ' 0,  '' 0.w w> ≥  The firm chooses  and  such that b t  
    ' ( ( )) ( ) 1,      bc h f f− ⋅ ⋅ =      (2a) 
    ' '( ( )) ( )tc h f f w− ⋅ ⋅ =       (2b) 
If we differentiate (2a) (with a symmetric condition for (2b)), if '' 0w = , which we will generally assume, we 
get 
    
' ''
'' 2 ' '' 2 '
''    bt t b b
b bb b bb
c f c f f c fdb dt dh
c f c f c f c f
−= +− −    (3) 
In (3), while the coefficient of dh  is unambiguously positive ''( 0,  0),bbc f> <  the coefficient of 
 can only be positive if 0 and bt btdt f f>  is “large”, or if b and t are “strong complements”. 
For well behaved functions, eqs. (2) can be solved so 
      ( )b b h=      (4a) 
      ( )t t h=      (4b) 
Utilizing eq. (3) and the corresponding term from differentiating (2b), we can show that 
    '' '  ( ) / 0b bt t bb
dt c c f f f f D
dh
= − ≥     (5a) 
    '' '  (  ) / 0t bt b tt
db c c f f f f D
dh
= − ≥     (5b) 
where '' 2 ' '' 2 ' '' ' 2 (  ) (  )  (  ) 0t tt b bb b t btD c f c f c f c f c f f c f= − − − − >  from second order conditions.  
/  and /  db dh dt dh are assumed to be positive so that and b t  are “normal” goods in response to increases 
harassment; a sufficient condition for this is that 0.btf >  For later reference, to ensure well-behaved interior 
outcomes it is convenient but not essential to assume 2 2 2 2/ ,  / 0d b dh dt dh ≤ , so that increases in harassment 
increase time and bribes at a decreasing rate. In the empirical section we estimate a form of eq. (4), yielding 
the coefficients in (5). We also examine the complementarity effects in (3) directly. 
If harassment increases both time and bribes enjoyed by local government employees, what limits 
harassment, apart from local social norms? One limit is firm exit, where in Bliss and Tella (1997), given 
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heterogeneous firms, corruption forces less efficient firms out of business. Another limit which we take here 
is to emphasize inter-jurisdictional competition, and exit to other jurisdictions. 
2.2 Local Government Demand for Regulation and Corruption 
There are two stages to modeling local government demand for regulation. First is to analyze firm location 
decisions and inter-jurisdictional competition for firms, so as to see how harassment affects the number of 
firms in a locality. The effect of harassment on the number of firms in a locality and hence on the local tax 
base is something local governments anticipate in policy decisions. The second stage formulates the nature of 
the local governments, their optimization problem and their fiscal situation. In the work to follow we assume 
there are two regions, i and j, with the model directly generalizing to n  regions. At some points we will 
impose symmetry across regions, to simply and illustrate key points.  
2.2.1 Harassment and Inter-Jurisdictional Competition for Firms  
For our firms, there is a fixed amount of labor, and i jL L , available in each region, split among the (identical) 
firms in the region. Each firm is run by an entrepreneur where nationally there are a fixed number, N , of 
entrepreneurs and firms, which are perfectly mobile so .i jN N N+ =  We first examine firm production 
technology, and then combine that with the corruption technology to look at location decisions.  
Firm Production Technology.  
If all entrepreneurs are identical, then per firm output in a region i is ( / ),  where ' 0, " 0i ix L N x x> < . 
Assuming competitive labor markets, so wage, 'w x= , we define firm revenue from production activity 
as ( / ) ( / ) /i i i i i iR N L x L N wL N= − , where we can show that4 
2
' 2 3
/ "( / ) ( / ) 0
/ "( / ) ( / ) 0
i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
dw dN x L N L N
dR dN R x L N L N
= − ⋅ >
≡ = ⋅ <    (6) 
Location Decisions.  
Combining production and corruption, in region i, per firm total profits are  
   ( / )  ( ( ,  )) ( ) .i i i i i i i i i iR N L c h f b t b w t Tπ = − − − − −     (7) 
Firms get net production revenue ( ),iR ⋅  have harassment and bribe costs of ( ( ,  ))  ( )i i i i ic h f b t b w t− + +  from 
(1), and pay a tax iT  set by the center and partially remitted to the local government. The regent anticipates 
that firms move between regions so 0.i jψ π π= − =  Given this, we can determine how a regent perceives 
harassment levels will affect the number of firms in her region, in a Nash context, where the regent is 
                                                 
4 ' 2 ( ' ) /  /  ( / ) . But given ' ,i i i i i i i idR x w L N dN w N L N dN x w= − + − ∂ ∂ =  we have the second equation in (6). 
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choosing harassment levels. Totally differentiating (7), we get 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' /   ( 1)   ( )   /   ( 1) 
i i i ji i i i i i b i i t t i j j j j j j b j
R dN L c dh c f db c f w dt R dN L c dh c f db− + − + − = − + −
'  ( )
j jj t t j
c f w dt+ − , where the regent sees iT as fixed. Utilizing eq. (2), imposing Nash perceptions at 
equilibrium by the regent in i that , , 0j j jdh db dt = , and having the regent recognize the national constraint on 
numbers of firms so that j jdN dN− = , we get  
'
' '   = 0 ( / / )h j
i i
i i i j j
dN c
dh R L R L
− <− −    (8) 
where 'R <0. In (8), as ih  rises in the numerator that increase costs and reduces profits to the representative 
firm which induces exit to region j. However, from the denominator, exit is limited by diminishing net firm 
revenues in j that occur with entry and rising net revenues in i that occur with exit. Again for later reference, 
to have well-behaved interior solutions, it is convenient but not essential to assume 2 2/ 0i id N dh ≤ , so that as 
harassment increases firms exit at an increasing rate. A sufficient condition in a symmetrical situation for this 
to hold is that 2 0.bb tt btf f f− ≥   
2.2.2      The Local Government’s Demand for Harassment Levels 
For regions, we look first at the regent’s revenue sources and expenditure requirements. Based on taxes 
collected from firms in the region, the iT  in eq. (6), the center remits to the locality a portion of that tax per 
firm, iTβ , so that the regent’s tax revenue is i iT Nβ . This i iT Nβ could also be adjusted to include general 
fiscal transfers dependent on local GDP or other measures of local economic activity that are influenced by 
the number of firms in the locality. Out of i iT Nβ , the regent must pay a salary, S, to the local government 
employee, or official, who works for her. The post salary residual is “profits” or net revenue kept by her or 
spent on improving public good quality. But it is thought that these capped tax revenues are insufficient to 
pay even the salaries of the base number of local officials needed to provide mandated public services. 
Corruption enters this process through its effect on the formal salary required for the local official. 
The local official hired by the regent must be paid utility .W  The local official has a utility function, 
( ( ) )y U t h N+ , where y is income. The second term is utility enjoyed by the official from time spent with 
local firms, where we assume ' 0, " 0U U> ≤ . Treating W is as fixed, the regent sees the official’s required 
salary as ( ) ( ( ) );i i i i iS W b h N U t h N= − −  or as the market utility less bribes collected by the official less the 
utility received by the local official from time devoted to him by local firms. Note we have not added in extra 
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direct revenue that the regent gets from the sale of licenses and imposition of levies; we simply normalize that 
revenue to zero.5  
Given these assumptions, we need an objective function for the regent in region i . The regent’s total 
net budget after paying the salary of the local official iB   is 
    ( ( ) ( ( ) ))i i i i i i i i iB T N W b h N U t h Nβ= − − − ,   (9) 
In the period for our data where harassment is still based on the pre-decentralization, pre-local democracy 
situation, we model the regent as a Leviathan government that seeks to maximize this budget. After the 
introduction of limited democracy in Indonesia, following Panizza (1999) and Arzaghi and Henderson (2004), 
we could model the political process as having an objective function that weights the utility of voters against 
that of the government, with weights representing the relative bargaining power of each group. For example 
the objective function could be 1( , )i i i iV w B B
θ θ−Ω = ,  where ( , )i iV w B is the quasi-indirect utility function of 
the representative worker. His income equals the local wage rate iw ; and, normalizing the cost of local public 
goods to 1, iB equals the level the level of local public services, ig . θ is the relative bargaining power of the 
representative voter in the political process, or the degree of democratization. But for the pre-decentralization 
period, without loss of generality as to concepts involved, we assume iΩ  is simply iB in a Leviathan situation 
where θ =0. Optimizing with respect to ih , we have 
  
2 2
/ / / / 0
/ 0.
i i i i i i i i
i i
dB dh B h B N N h
d B dh
= ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ⋅∂ ∂ =
<    (10) 
In the first order condition , the /i iB h∂ ∂ term represents the benefits of increasing harassment—
increased corruption and bribes for the local official which reduces his formal salary and increases the public 
budget (from (9), /i iB h∂ ∂ = [ / ' / ]N db dh U dt dh+ ⋅  which from (5) is positive). The term / /i i i iB N N h∂ ∂ ⋅∂ ∂  
represents the costs of increased harassment: the lost revenues because firms exit the kabupaten in response to 
increased harassment (from (9) / /i i i iB N N h∂ ∂ ⋅∂ ∂ = [  ' ] /T t U b dN dhβ + ⋅ + , where /dN dh <0).6  The first 
                                                 
5 If hp is some exogenously regulated harassment fee so total harassment revenues are i i ip N h , that adds to the 
harassment determination terms reflecting lost harassment fees when a firm exits plus gained monies when h is 
increased. 
6 Under partial democracy the benefits and costs of increasing h are respectively 
1 1[ (1 ) ] [ / ' / ]gV V B V B N db dh U dt dh
θ θ θ θθ θ− − −+ − + ⋅  and 
1 1 1 1{ / [ (1 ) ][  ' ]} { / }w gV B V dw dN V B V V B T t U b dN dh
θ θ θ θ θ θθ θ θ β− − − − −+ + − + ⋅ + . In the cost expression, the first term in 
the first curly brackets is the effect of changes in firms on wages. While the expressions are more complicated they have 
the same economic interpretation. 
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order condition balances out these two forces. For the second order condition, sufficient conditions are  
2 2 2
2 2 20,  0,  , 0,  , 0,  U" 0
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
dN d N db dt d b d t
dh dh dh dh dh dh
< ≤ > ≤ ≤ . Note we are assuming that each kabupaten 
perceives taxes are capped at too low a rate, so / 0i idB dT > at the current iT .  
Here we have modeled the choice of harassment and related corruption by the regent as helping 
ensure local officials receive market compensation, with the degree of harassment limited by inter-
jurisdictional competition for firms. There are other limits on corruption, although so far in Indonesia these do 
not appear to be direct penalties for being caught (Mookerjee and Png, 1995 and Cadot, 1987). But in the 
empirical work, we do consider observed and unobserved heterogeneity of the characteristics of local 
officials, in particular their degree of education, which might affect either their sensibilities to media scrutiny 
and social pressure to limit corruption or their perceptions about the long-term effects of corruption on local 
economic growth and ultimately the resources available to them.  
With this framework we can examine the effect on corruption of changes in fiscal situations. In 
particular we want to show that if inter-governmental transfers or money rebated from tax collections in the 
locality go up, harassment, bribes and corruption are likely to decline. That is, we want to show that an 
increase in iTβ (because either or both β and iT are increased) reduces ih . We can do this by simple 
differentiation for the symmetrical case where iTβ  is increased everywhere by the same amount, so eq.(10) 
continues to apply everywhere with the same arguments;7 imposing symmetry avoids having to detail the full 
impact on reaction functions required for the asymmetric case. Differentiating eq. (10) with respect to 
iTβ and ih  yields 
2 2/ 0.
( ) ( / ) / ( )
i i i
i i i i
dh d B dh
d T d dB dh d Tβ β= − <    (11) 
We know from the second order condition in (10) that 2 2/ 0i id B dh < . Given (9), 
( / ) / ( ) / 0i i i i id dB dh d T dN dhβ = < . Based on this result for the symmetric case with a Leviathan 
government, we argue that the forces are there for increased inter-governmental transfers to reduce 
harassment and corruption more generally. This paper will examine empirically the suggestions of this 
analysis: do kabupaten receiving more transfers have lower harassment levels? 
 
  
                                                 
7 Note the ,i jT T  terms cancel out in the derivation leading to eq. (8). 
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2. Empirical Work: The Effects of Regulation (Harassment) on Firms 
 
This section examines the effects of local regulations on firm bribe payments and time spent with local 
officials. The section is divided into several parts. First we discuss the specifics of bribing in Indonesia in 
order to motivate a formulation to equations (4) on the extent of bribes paid and then later the extent of time 
spent with local officials. Second we describe the data and econometric issues in estimation. Third we present 
results on bribe activity, for several formulations; and finally we turn to an analysis of time spent with local 
officials.  
2.1 Corruption in Indonesia 
A number of forms of corruption as faced by firms emerge from the survey results and investigations by local 
researchers. We start with forms of harassment. The dominant form is licensing, the most important source of 
local discretionary revenues and reputedly one of the two main sources of bribe activity. Depending on what a 
firm produces and where it locates, it must procure a variety of licenses, both to start and then to operate a 
business. For operational licenses which we focus on the median, mean and standard deviation of licenses for 
those reporting are respectively 5, 5.8, and 4.9. For start-up licenses similar numbers are reported. Corruption 
involved in licensing involves waiting time for licenses, where licenses must be renewed annually. Without 
the proper license for a particular activity (e.g., operate a business, make noise, create congestion, pollute in 
different dimensions, export, etc.), a firm variously may be harassed by neighbors and inspectors, unable to 
perform certain functions, or have all operations suspended. Bribes are paid for each license simply so 
officials do not hold up the granting of the license. Firms sometimes hire middlemen (“calo”) to help procure 
licenses and pay the requisite bribes. 
 In terms of other forms of harassment, firms face “local levies and retributions” for having an 
escalator, operating a water pump, operating a generator, etc. Bribes are paid to spread payments over a 
period of time, perhaps a rather minor item. But for local levies and retributions, there may also be an element 
of defraud of the state, where the application of specific levies is subject to some negotiation. The survey has 
some information on levies and retributions, which we can control for. Finally, starting in the last 2-3 years, 
firms face official octroi taxation (taxes on movements of good across kabupaten boundaries). For timely 
movement of goods, bribes must also be paid in addition to the octroi tax. We want to control for this form of 
harassment. 
Apart from harassment, there is another source of bribes not analyzed yet, which is defraud of the 
state of tax revenues, a form of corruption we need to control for. For fraud involving tax collections the main 
form is bribes paid to reduce property taxes. While the official national property tax rate is .5% on market 
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value of tangible assets, Economic Census data suggest the de facto rate averages about .25%. This 
differential presents an opportunity for bribe activity. Why is that? Property taxes are assessed and collected 
by the center, before remittances back to the locality. The property tax collector in a kabupaten is assigned a 
target for collections, which is typically based on historical collections and generally is met (with no reward 
for collection in excess of the target). The target is universally considerably less than what is hypothetically 
legally owed for the kabupten. Thus assessors and tax collectors are presented with a great opportunity for 
graft, in the form of collecting some portion of the gap between the legal tax liability of a firm and the on-
average much lower target. Given potential legal liabilities, firms can lower their assessed payments by 
bribing assessors not inspect a building and to accept their statement of what the capital contents are. 
Collectors can be bribed on an annual basis, to lower the tax bill below legal assessed taxes for businesses 
claiming “special” circumstances such as cash-flow problems, poor sales, etc. Collectors and assessors work 
out of the same building and how they split the “surplus” that potentially is at hand we don’t know. 
Empirical implementation of this aspect of corruption requires an adaptation of the model in section 
2, so firms have property. Suppose a firm’s full tax liabilities are ,  where  tK t is the official tax rate and 
K the full value of property. Given ,  a firm pays  (1 ),tK tK α− where α is the forgiveness rate. For the 
typical firm in a kabupaten, α  represents the gap between full tax liabilities and target tax collections, both of 
which are set by the center. While α  is the overall forgiveness rate for the kabupaten, officials will negotiate 
with each firm as a bribe, a portion γ of tKα , since the firm's official tax liabilities remain .tK  This bribe 
tKγα is determined by bargaining, where bargaining power depends on the firm’s influence with other 
government officials, the security of the official’s position, the local attitude towards corruption, and the like. 
In a Nash bargaining context threat points could be to shut down, or seize the business unless γ =1, versus to 
offer the official close to nothing. We can’t observe any of this process, but we estimate for the typical firm 
 and .α γ  If actual taxes paid are  (1 )tK α− and bribes tKαγ , then for later reference  
   bribes in    [actual taxes paid in ]
1
i iαγα= ⋅−     (12) 
We note that we could incorporate defraud of the state into the analysis in Section 1 of strategic interactions 
across kabupaten; however it is more complicated. While firms might seem to want lower ,γ  if γ is lowered, 
collectively that would increase official salaries needed to pay local officials, forcing them to look for other 
sources of revenue (e.g., harassment).  
 A final form of corruption involving defraud of the state (by the state) we probably don’t see for our 
sample of firms. Some local budgets go to “shadow salaries” although these are increasingly subject to media 
scrutiny. On development projects such as road construction, kick-backs to local officials are built into the 
 13
public budget and corresponding project bids. We generally don’t cover construction firms and data on 
shadow salaries are non-existent. 
 Based on this discussion, bribes paid by firms consist of four elements – bribes to encourage the 
timely granting of licenses, bribes to receive various considerations concerning levies and retribution, bribes 
for the transport of goods, and bribes to reduce assessed property taxes. The information we have is total 
bribes/costs, numbers of licenses, location information that would affect the extent of potential octroi 
taxation, attitudinal questions on levies and retributions before and after decentralization, and total 
taxes/costs, We don’t know total costs or sales, so we formulate the following for firm  in kabupaten k j  
 
1 1
bribes   ( )   ln  (no. of licenses )
costs
taxes  (location )   (attitudes on levies )   .
1 costs
kj kj
kj
kj kj kj
kj
C Z
D L
β
αγ εα
  = +  
   + + + +   −   
  (13) 
Eq. (13) is an implementation of eq. (4a), with a corresponding form for (4b). The first term  ( )kjC Z  
represents a set of qualitative controls for firm costs (see below). In the second term the 1β  coefficient on 
number of licenses captures how bribes rise with harassment, in the form of the number of licenses. The ( )D i  
function controls for possible bribes connected with location and transport. The main control is distance to the 
nearest of six major urban centers, given transport routes run out from mayor cities. We also experimented 
with whether the kabupaten is on the coast and can avoid octroi taxation by shipping by boat. While that 
reduced bribes, the coefficient is always insignificant and we drop the variable. The ( )L ⋅  function on 
harassment from levies and retributions consists of two variables. One asks about the obstacles for firm k  
created by levies and redistributions with a response grade 1-6, from “very small” to “very big”. The second 
asks with the same response range whether the recent regional autonomy law (see below) resulted in the 
creation of new levies. It is a little difficult to interpret these attitudinal variables, since responses may be 
conditioned on expectations as to what is normal in the specific kabupaten. The last term before the error term 
is based on eq. (13) where bribes paid for taxes are /(1 )αγ α−  where α  is the forgiveness rate on 
assessments and γ  is the bribe rate on forgiven taxes. Below we will present evidence from the Industrial 
Census on α . Finally we note that in eq. (13), we will control for the fact that some firms paying bribes 
report paying no taxes or having no licenses, or both. These will turn out to be rather interesting firms.  
We now turn to data sources and econometric issues. 
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2.2 Data and Econometric Issues 
LPEM, an institute at the University of Indonesia, carried out the corruption survey of 1,808 firms in 
Indonesia, randomly selected across all economic activity in 64 kabupaten between September 2001 and June 
2002. The survey covered many attitudinal questions and quantitative questions about regulations and taxes. 
Just before this time period, in January 2001, as described in Section 3, decentralization was enacted and 
some questions deal with firms’ fears about the effects of decentralization (e.g., their anticipation as to how 
the number of levies and retribution would be affected, a control in (13)). In a survey on corruption as noted 
earlier, the big issue is how to elicit responses that seem to be fairly accurate. Pre-survey testing suggested 
that, in Indonesia, asking for absolute monetary figures on bribes, taxes and the like would not bring forth 
many accurate responses. So, respondents were asked about the ratio of bribes and of taxes to total costs. 
 The information on bribing was elicited carefully, with many examples of what constituted bribes 
(shopping trips to Singapore, gifts, under-the-table payments, etc.) and with return visits to initial non-
respondents. Giving of gifts per se is not illegal in Indonesia, although bribing is, so the issue of what might 
be illegal was carefully avoided. Besides the interviewers, a representative from the local Chamber of 
Commerce (non-governmental) was present at interviews, with the tested idea that this would facilitate “a 
conversation among friends”. Out of 1,808 firms, 75% gave positive responses on bribes. The distribution of 
responses is given in Figure 1, for those giving positive answers. There is some tendency to bunch responses 
at numbers like 5%, 10%, 15% but many responses are much more nuanced. Of the 25% non-respondents, the 
interviewers felt perhaps a quarter of those actually paid no bribes, while the rest simply wouldn’t reveal a 
magnitude. Those not responding had no particular pattern across typical firm characteristics such as size or 
industry. However, as we will see, a high proportion of non-respondents also reported paying no taxes, but 
reporting spending a lot of time smoothing business operations. For reasons discussed below, we think non-
respondents typically paid high bribes. 
 Given these ratio questions, such as bribes as a fraction of costs, the intent had been to gauge firm 
size by asking about sales, as well as a three-sector industry breakdown, employment in three size categories 
and information on whether the firm exported, had FDI investment, or had the government as a partial 
shareholder. The interviewees turned out to perhaps be cagey; and it became clear that absolute continuous 
numbers on sales were unlikely to be forthcoming from a large enough set of respondents. So the 
questionnaire was adjusted and firms slotted themselves into four size categories by sales. However, for 
researchers, that leaves rather imprecise controls in the kjZ variables in (13) for firm size and profitability. 
The first econometric issue involves the 25% of respondents reporting no bribes. This is not simple  
truncation or Heckman-type selection, because the non-respondents contain both those who pay no bribes and 
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those who do not report. Moreover, a high percentage of non-respondents (about 75%) also do not report 
taxes. For reasons which will become apparent, we believe many of these responded correctly on the tax 
question and lied on the bribe question, paying significant non-reported bribes. Nevertheless we did 
experiment with selection modeling for non-respondents where we related non-response to attitudinal 
questions on whether a firm says it faced recent labor problems, thinks the recent general election was good 
for them, or believes the police currently protect them and their property. Those who answer (“breezily”) that 
everything is fine are significantly less likely to report bribes. In the experimentation with a selection 
formulation, both Mills’ ratios in the 2-step formulation and correlation coefficients in the ML formulation 
are insignificant; and selection has no discernible pattern of effects. Therefore we do not report selection 
results below. However we do test robustness of our results to adding back into the sample those reporting no 
bribes, with various ascribed bribe rates.  
The second set of econometric issues concerns omitted variables. There may be unobserved 
kabupaten characteristics (greed of current local officials, current fiscal circumstances) affecting both RHS 
and LHS variables. We experiment with kabupaten fixed effects to deal with this problem. Kabupaten fixed 
effects are rejected (resoundingly) by Hausman tests, in favor of either OLS or random effects. The rejection 
implies that unobserved kabupaten characteristics affecting bribe ratio magnitudes do not affect RHS 
variables facing firms, a very strong result. So the de facto number of licenses a firm faces is not affected by, 
say, the greed of local license grantors. However, random effects are preferred to OLS ones (Breusch-Pagan 
multiplier test). The random effects finding suggests that local “greed” exists so, ceteris paribus, typical bribe 
rates vary across localities; but the rejection of fixed effects suggests licenses, retributions and so on are set 
exogenous to the greed of on-line officials by, say, the regents and local legislatures. 
Finally, there are also unobserved characteristics of firms related to the “slickness” of the 
entrepreneur in handling bribes, which would affect not just the bribe payment but also directly taxes as a 
fraction of costs, a right-hand side variable. While a strategy would be to instrument, one problem is that we 
have no firm characteristics that are obviously exogenous and don’t also affect the dependent variable. We 
construct historical kabupaten characteristics that are arguably valid instruments, predicting, local effective 
tax rates, where historical fiscal circumstances, sophistication of public officials, manufacturing, and wealth 
and educational measures are not related to current measures of greed or firm “slickness” but may predict 
effective current effective local tax rates, which are historically based. The problem will turn out to be that 
instruments are weaker than one would like, but we will report key results on IV work below. 
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2.3 Results on Bribing 
Basic Results  
Results on bribes paid are reported in Table 1, based on the OLS formulation. As noted random effects are 
significant; but we prefer an OLS formulation, allowing for more general clustering of errors. In Table 1, we 
focus on the column (i) results which are a specification of the relationship in eq. (4a), as given in eq. (13), 
looking at the continuous harassment and fraud variables. The mean and standard deviation of the bribe/cost 
ratio are 10.5 and 10.8 respectively. The harassment variables have hypothesized effects, and indicate the 
extent to which more harassment leads to more bribes.  
Foremost in the results is that a doubling of the number of licenses (ln 2) raises the bribe ratio by .85. 
An increase in the absolute number of licenses from 1 to 16, or to 2 standard deviations above the mean, 
raises the bribe ratio by 3.3. Similarly for “levies are obstacles”, a one-standard deviation increase in this 
rating (1.55) raises the bribe ratio by 1.2. For “new levies since autonomy law” a one-standard deviation 
increase raises the bribe ratio by .87. Finally for distance, a one-standard deviation increase raises the bribe 
ratio by .54.  
 Turning to the tax-fraud variable, the coefficient identifies (1 ) / ,  where γ α α α−  is the forgiveness 
rate on taxes and γ  is the bribe rate on forgiven taxes. The coefficient is .408. From the Annual Survey of 
Medium and Large Enterprises for manufacturing firms, for a sample size of 9784, we regress indirect taxes 
paid ((1 ) )tKα−  on the market value of all land, buildings and capital machinery ( ).K  From Table 2, the 
coefficient gives an overall estimate of (1 )tα− , which is .00263. (The coefficient is .00248 if zeros are 
included in LHS observations and a sample is 14,289.)  The estimate is “tight” but the R2 is low; there is 
enormous cross-kabupaten and cross firm variation in taxes paid. While in theory, indirect taxes are property 
taxes, in practice they also include special assessments, such as for firms with government links. Given an 
official tax rate  of .005, the Table 2 coefficientt implies an α  of .47. From Table 1 that, in turn, implies 
aγ of .37. So, local officials collect under the table about 37% of forgiven taxes, on average across Indonesia. 
 The qualitative variables on bribes, dealing with firms that report paying but paying no taxes or 
having no licenses, suggest the bribing situation is more complicated than suggested so far. Those paying no 
taxes report a bribe ratio that is increased by a large 7.3 (given a mean bribe ratio of 10.8) and those reporting 
no licenses report a bribe ratio that is higher by 3.1. (For firms reporting both no bribes and no taxes, a 
formulation separating out this event suggests the two components are simply additive, as in our formulation.) 
The implication of these dummy variables is that some firms bribe their way out of one or the other (or both) 
obligations. For taxes that is plausible; and the presumption is that firms bribing their way out of all tax 
obligations pay a very high bribe cost. For licenses, the consensus among observers is that a firm must have a 
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license if it engages in any specific licensed activity. But the data suggest there may firms with certain types 
of activities, where a firm can bribe its way out of all licensing. This remains a puzzle that only further 
surveying can resolve, especially given every firm is required to have an operating license at a minimum. The 
issue of paying bribes to eliminate obligations will appear below in the analysis of time allocation, as well. 
 In terms of control variables, the bribe ratio declines with firm size: harassment obligations involve 
relatively fixed sums. Firms with foreign exposure especially FDI appear to pay more, either because they are 
more profitable or more visible and constrained by appearances (must pay their taxes; will face more 
neighborhood protests if their licenses are not up-to-date). While having the government as a shareholder 
seems to reduce bribes, the effect is not significant. 
IV Estimation.  
The estimates in column (i) of Table 1 face problems of bias, because unobserved slickness of the firm 
manager affects both bribes paid and taxes paid. To deal with this, we constructed a variety of fiscal and 
historical instruments. To predict taxes paid, the best instruments were the 1997 median tax rate reported by 
manufacturing firms in the Annual Survey of Medium and Large [Manufacturing] Enterprises, and historical 
variables reflecting the overall kabupaten tax base which affect the current tax targets set by the center: 1990 
average employment of manufacturing firms, % population finishing high school (1990), percent households 
owning their house (1990), percent villages with paved roads (1986), average altitude of the population, and 
the percent of manufacturing firms in 1985 in the kabupaten with no formal sector status. We used these to 
instrument for the tax to cost ratio and the dummy variable for no taxes reported paid. But we note that 
instruments are weak: for example, for the tax-cost ratio variable, the first stage F-statistic for the instruments 
is 6.7, with a partial 2R of about .03.  
 In 2SLS results for column (i) in Table 1 the tax/cost coefficient rises from .41 to .56, with a standard 
error of .35. If that point estimate is used, it says that for a forgiveness rate ( ) of .47, α the bribe rate, ,γ  is 
.50. Then 50% of taxes not paid to the government go as bribes to the collectors or assessors. This is higher 
than the OLS estimate of 37%, but is consistent with a split the surplus model of bargaining between the firm 
and tax agent.  In the 2SLS the dummy variable coefficient for no taxes paid has, not surprisingly, a large 
standard error (8.9) and a not stable coefficient. Other coefficients weaken as well, in the sense that standard 
errors generally rise. Our conclusion is that IV estimation is problematic, but reinforces the basic findings. 
Other Results and Robustness 
In column (iii), we give corresponding results for firms responding as to what percent of set-up costs new 
firms in their area pay in bribes. The question is asked of all firms and newer firms do not appear to have 
differential responses, but the overall response rate is lower than for column (i). The question isn’t as clearly 
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defined in terms of what are “set-up bribes” distinct from operational ones, but the pattern of results is similar. 
Now licenses are set-up licenses and doubling these, as expected, has a noticeable impact (.86) on the bribe 
ratio (with its mean of about 9.). Perhaps the main difference relative to column (i) on operational bribes 
concerns the control variables. Now size effects are insignificant and FDI firms pay less, not more. For the 
latter, the implication is that kabupaten lure in FDI investors, asking lower set-up bribes; but once in place 
these firms pay more. 
 Next, we turn to results in column (ii) of Table 1, which is an estimation of the eq. (13) formulation 
based on the first order condition (2a). That is, to the bribe equation we add an (endogenous) right-hand side 
variable, time spent smoothing local officials. The point is to show certain correlations; it proved futile to try 
to find reasonable instruments for the time variable8. In terms of correlations in column (ii), as time devoted 
to public officials rises, so do bribes. This supports the notion that in eq. (3), 0,btf >  or in bribing 
technology, time and bribes are “complements”. Bribing doesn’t eliminate hassle; rather hassle and bribes go 
together. 
 To this equation, we also add other aspects of bribing (which additions don’t affect the magnitude of 
the time coefficient). If firms can better predict bribes (on a scale of 1-6),  or “know the prices”, they actually 
pay less. We anticipated a positive correlation: firms would pay a premium to operate in an environment 
where prices are known. Instead the issue seems to be that, in any environment, some firms know the prices 
and others don’t: those who don’t spend more, and, as we will see below, also spend more time smoothing. 
This would be consistent with the micro-foundations outlined in footnote 3. Those who know prices don’t 
need to experiment with time and money. Finally in terms of the bribe ratio, perceptions about whether 
promised “services” will be delivered don’t affect the bribe ratio. 
Finally there is an issue of robustness of the Table 1 column (i) results, to the inclusion of firms 
reporting no bribes, which are currently excluded from the estimating equation. As note earlier, traditional 
sample selection approaches aren’t fruitful. But in the next section, we note that many of those who report no 
bribes report spending large amounts of time smoothing business operations with local officials, and report 
having no taxes or no licenses. The concern is that these people in fact may be paying large bribes to avoid 
taxes or licenses all together and refusing to answer the bribe question. To test robustness of our results to this 
possibility, we re-estimate column (i) in Table 1 adding back in those reporting no bribes and giving them all 
a very high value—35. For the sample size of 1754, not surprisingly the dummy variable coefficients for no 
taxes and no licenses rise dramatically (to 21.4 and 6.2 respectively), since many of these observations are 
                                                 
8 The first stage F-statistic on plausible instruments for time (such as education of local officials and kabupaten wealth 
variables representing sophistication of local officials) is 2.3 and the partial 2R  is .011. While instrumenting for this 
variable alone raises the coefficient to .189, the standard error is .380. 
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now given bribe values of 35. But it is the slope coefficients on harassment variables that we are interested in. 
These tend to fall modestly because we have added in observations assigned high bribe rates, where people 
tend to report no harassment: the new [and old] coefficients on licenses, taxes, levies as obstacles, and new 
levies are a problem are 1.11 [1.20], .354 [.408], .634 [.766], and .438 [.639]. Nevertheless, given the 
experiment, our basic results seem stable. We also experimented with inserting a predicted value of bribes, 
rather then just assigning 35 for those without reported bribe ratios. Predicted bribes for non-respondents can 
be backed out based on the Table 3, column (ii) formulation of the time smoothing equation below, with the 
bribe ratio as a covariate (given most firms report time smoothing, even if they don’t report bribes). The 
results again are very similar to those in Table, but the procedure suffers from the flaw that predicted bribe 
values are based on biased coefficients.9 
2.4 Results on Time Allocation 
In Table 3 we present results on time spent by management to smooth business operations with local officials, 
an estimation of the time equation in (4). The time spent variable has a higher response rate and, as we will 
see, contributes to our understanding of the non-response problem. The dependent variable is six categories of 
the percent of management time spent smoothing: 0-5%, 5-15%, 15-25%, 25-50%, 50-75%, over 75%. We 
estimate the model by OLS using mid-point values for the categories and by ordered Probit, getting 
qualitatively similar results with similar quantitative interpretations. We present the OLS results in Table 3, 
along with ordered probit estimates in the last column. The first column gives base OLS results; and the 
second adds bribe payments as a covariate and thus represents an estimation of eq. (2b), as opposed to (4b).  
Basic Results.  
In column (i) we start with the continuous corruption variables. A doubling of licenses increases management 
time by 1.2 percent points, while a one standard deviation increase in the tax ratio and “levies are obstacles” 
respectively raise time by 1.1 and 1.7 points. For taxes the interpretation is that an increased tax ratio affects 
both time dealing with assessors and collectors. For the distance variable and issues of goods transport, a one-
standard deviation increase in distance raises smoothing time by .88. While the “new levies are a problem 
                                                 
9 In Table 3, column (ii) the equation based on (2b) is estimated for the sample of firms all reporting time, bribes, taxes 
and licenses. We can then back-out a predicted bribe from this time smoothing equation for those excluded people 
reporting no bribe (but reporting time smoothing): the predicted bribe is actual time smoothing minus predicted time 
smoothing (excluding the bribe covariate), all divided by the bribe coefficient. Note however as discussed above 
estimates of coefficients based on eqs. (2a) and (2b) are biased. Inserting this predicted value as a LHS variable in the 
Table 1 column (i) formulation of bribes paid for those reporting no bribes, we re-estimate. The new [and old] 
coefficients on licenses, taxes, levies as obstacles, and new levies are a problem are 1.17 [1.20], .370 [.408], .851 [.766], 
and -.291 [.639]. Only for the variable speculating about new levies is there a drastic change.   
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since autonomy” is positive, it is insignificant. Overall, the idea that a cost of increased harassment is more 
time devoted to officials comes through clearly. 
 Next the dummy variable results are of considerable interest. Those reporting no bribes but paying 
both taxes and licenses spend considerably less time smoothing (4.1% points). While those reporting no 
bribes and either paying no taxes or having no licenses spend considerably more time smoothing operations 
(6.9 and 5.0 points respectively). These results suggest two possibilities. First, those reporting taxes and 
licenses but no bribes may be telling the truth: they could be the 5% of firms surveyed who actually don’t pay 
bribes. They pay their official taxes, wait for their licenses and spend little time with local officials. Second, 
those reporting no bribes and either no taxes or no licenses, a group we call non-respondents, spend much 
more time with public officials. Table 1 results for firms not paying taxes or not having licenses but still 
willing to report bribes suggest non-respondents probably pay large bribes. We looked also at whether non-
respondents differ from other firms. For a Probit on who is a non-respondent --“who lies or not”-- non-
response rises if the firm is large, in or near a major metro area, has no government ownership, and doesn’t 
export.10  Finally we note that in Table 3 column (i), the small number of firms who report bribes but have 
either no taxes or no licenses have insignificant, although positive coefficients. It could be that some of these 
firms may actually be exempt from taxes or somehow possibly licenses.  
In Table 3 for the relationship between firm characteristics and time, in column (i), firm size and all 
other characteristics except industry (service) have insignificant coefficients. For industry, the perception is 
that certain visible urban services, such as hotels and restaurants, are subject to considerable harassment. 
Other Results.  
Column (ii) estimates the first order condition eq. (2b), ignoring the endogeneity problem. As in Table 1, the 
correlation patterns suggest bribes and time are complements, where a (unbiased) positive coefficient on the 
bribe ratio would require 0.btf >  In addition, the variable on predictability of bribes lowers time spent with 
public officials, consistent with the bribe result in column (ii) Table 1. Finally, getting the promised services, 
while not costing more (Table 1), is associated with spending more time with public officials. 
 Column (iii) gives ordered Probit results. While variables appear to have signs corresponding to those 
in other columns, with ordered Probit, interpretation is tedious. We give one illustration. For a large, non-
                                                 
10 Given these results, we also looked at the bribe-equation sample selection issue again. We look at all firms who 
answered the time question (about 1777). We then define as non-respondents, those who are “liars”, or who report either 
no taxes or no licenses, and also no bribes. For the continuous equation, the sample is all those with positive bribes plus 
those with no bribes but both having licenses and paying taxes. Again, in a selection model, the Mills’ ratio coefficient is 
insignificant, as is the correlation coefficient for the two errors in the full ML full version. 
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export, non-FDI, non-government, manufacturing firm at an average distance, with average attitudes on 
levies, with an average numbers of licenses and kabupaten characteristics, and paying bribes and taxes and 
having licenses, we examine the effect on the probability of being in the six smoothing time orders, of a 
change in the tax to cost ratio. For the tax ratio at the mean, the probabilities of being in the lowest to highest 
order are .30, .38, .23, .082, .0108, and .0024 respectively. If the tax ratio rises by one-standard deviation, the 
probabilities become .26, .38, .25, .097, .014, and .0033. Then, for example, the probability of being in the 
lowest group falls 12%, while the probability of being in the top group rises 39%. If we assign mid-point 
values for time in the 6 categories, the expected amount of time with average taxes is 13.0, while with the one 
standard deviation increase in the tax ratio, it is 14.1. To compare with column (i) results, this 1.1 increase in 
expected time is exactly equal to the OLS estimate of a 1.1 increase in time if the tax cost variable increases 
by one standard deviation. It appears OLS captures the relationships involved well enough. 
 
   3. The Effects of Fiscal Capacity on Corruption. 
 
3.1. The Context 
In January 2001, Indonesia implemented extensive decentralization, following legislation enacted in 1999. 
Our survey starts in September 2001 and runs through June 2002. Our survey is so close to the time of 
decentralization, to the extent harassment in our data is linked to the local fiscal situation, it will be to the pre-
decentralization situation. We give a brief description of the pre-decentralization situation and then relate it to 
the post-decentralization situation. As we will see, revenue structures facing kabupaten governments are very 
similar before and after decentralization.  
Before decentralization, local governments had autonomy over a limited range of services such as 
construction and maintenance of local side streets, parks, and other more minor infrastructure. Other public 
services were provided centrally. Also major types of construction projects were usually centrally approved or 
mandated and paid for out of capital construction transfer (INPRES) monies, to be spent on, say, constructing 
a specific school (or hospital) in a specific district of the kabupten.   
On the revenue side prior to decentralization, the major categories of revenues for discretionary 
expenditures were the portion (64.8%) of national property taxes rebated back to the kabupaten, local license 
and levy fees, and residual inter-governmental transfers, some of which seem arbitrary and some connected, 
for example, with the kabupaten’s generation of natural resource related revenues. While we know absolute 
magnitudes for each of these items in some years, detailing their exact shares in local budgets is hard. Prior to 
decentralization, the local kabupaten administration also acted as a “cashier” for the national government 
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formally paying for most operational expenditures of the national government (e.g. teachers’ salaries) within 
the kabupaten. These cashier money transfers, or pass-through monies were called “SDO” funds, but not all of 
these can be separated out from locally raised revenues, especially in certain miscellaneous categories. 
Moreover, all monies are mingled on the expenditure side, making it impossible to separate out locally 
determined versus nationally mandated local expenditures. Such a separation would have allowed us to 
examine how local expenditures are funded.  
 With decentralization, most expenditure functions governing local public services including 
schooling, health care, public works, communications, environmental regulation and policing were 
decentralized to the kabupaten level. In essence the cashier for formerly nationally provided local public 
services became the new provider. However, while legislative functions are decentralized, most critically 
revenue functions are not and the effective revenue structure remains similar to the pre-decentralization one. 
Formally, now localities get extensive inter-governmental transfers from the center, under the DAU program, 
which accounts for about 50% of local revenues. However most DAU monies are based on a “hold harmless 
condition”, relating these DAU monies to the former SDO cashier funds transferred to the kabupaten. The 
idea is that minimum DAU transfers should be enough so the kabupaten can afford to pay the same teachers 
who were on the payroll before decentralization whom they now formally employ, with a similar constraint 
covering historical capital expenditures, as well as pay the salaries of former central government 
administrative personnel whose employment has now shifted to the kabupaten.  
In 2001, apart from DAU transfer funds, the three main sources of local government revenues are as 
before. Non-discretionary sources are first property taxes accounting for about 19% of local revenues, and 
second transfers from the national government of some revenues generated by the sale of oil, natural gas, 
mining, and forest and fishery products from the kabupten (replacing the former residual category of 
transfers). The latter vary enormously across kabupaten, depending on the resource bases of the kabupaten, 
although on average they only account for 6% of local revenues. As before, the only source of local 
discretionary revenues are from harassment- the sale of licenses and “special levies and retributions” on 
aspects of business operations, with bribes being the unofficial component that alleviates salary obligations. 
Collections from sales of licenses and impositions of levies average about 23% of the local budget. We don’t 
have a breakdown between licenses and levies; but, in a survey of local government heads carried out at the 
same time as our firm survey, 75% report licenses as being the more dominant form of revenues.  
The common perception as noted in the introduction is that local governments in Indonesia are 
“under-funded”. Prior to decentralization, monies from property taxes and from general transfer revenues 
were insufficient to fund competitive salaries of local officials and provide basic services over which the 
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kabupaten had autonomy. Post-decentralization, property tax transfer revenues, natural resource based 
transfer revenues, and the new program (DAU) of inter-governmental transfers (where the last are pegged to 
historical levels of central government provision of local services) are similarly insufficient to meet budgetary 
needs. As yet we can’t tell whether the situation is better or worse overall, in terms of the extent of under-
funding but one anticipates that with time the situation will be worse, unless central government transfers 
grow at a higher rate than expected. Regardless, local governments impose regulations before and after 
decentralization so as, in part, to allow local officials to collect bribes to supplement their salaries. At the end 
of the theory section we argued that, in this context, an increase in transfer revenue sources will reduce 
harassment, since the local government would then need to rely less on harassment, which tends to drive 
firms from the kabupaten. Here we test this notion.   
The test we perform is to see if harassment varies with fiscal circumstances. Specifically we examine 
the determinants of the main form of harassment, which has also a quantitative measure: the number of 
licenses. There are a number of other tests one might like to perform which we discuss in a sub-section below. 
The number of licenses facing a firm is partly determined by firm characteristics like size and activities such 
as whether the firm exports and hence needs a license to do so. Controlling for firm characteristics, we 
examine whether harassment levels are affected by kabapaten fiscal needs, and also sophistication of local 
public officials. For the latter, we know the education level of the village head (in interval form), a basic level 
of administrator within the kabupaten. As a cultural-taste control, we test whether kabupaten with a greater 
fraction of heads who have completed high school utilize harassment less, perhaps because they simply 
“enjoy” administering harassment and soliciting bribes less.  
Turning to how we measure fiscal needs, while we have argued that kabupaten are under-funded, the 
need to utilize harassment will depend on the degree of under-funding. Thus the use of harassments is a 
function of a “fiscal gap”. The fiscal gap is the “demand” for local public services less outside revenues 
received. In section 1, we focused on a Leviathan government, where demand would come from central 
mandates for localities to fulfill certain functions. But we also outlined and footnoted a more general process 
where citizen demand for public services is represented. Here, we assume the demand in the political process 
for local services is an increasing function of size, or population, and income, or GDP per capita.  For outside 
revenues, we use 1999 fiscal variables. Records for 2000 are messed up because of a change in the dates of 
the fiscal year. Post-decentralization 2001 fiscal variables are unlikely to influence the numbers of licenses in 
place, as reported in 2001. For fiscal variables,  we have two -- transfers back to the kabupaten from property 
tax collections by the center and residual, general transfers (as noted above based to some extent on natural 
resources rents collected by the center). In principle, property tax and residual transfers could have the same 
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effect; but, in fact, property tax revenues are long standing and “certain”, so those with greater access to such 
revenues have less long term need for harassment. We enter these two fiscal magnitudes as a fraction of local 
GDP.11  While we have many firms, we have only 64 kabupaten and covariates are rather collinear, so we 
approximate functional forms and use a short variable list.  
3.2     The Empirical Formulation and Results for Harassment. 
Harassment is measured as the count of licenses, where the median is 5 for those reporting licenses. We 
estimate a Poisson count model for the absolute number of licenses per firm, and also look at equivalent 
regressions of the determinants of the log of the number of licenses. We treat zero licenses as missing values 
given every firm should have an least a license to operate per se; but we will also report results where zeros 
are treated as true zeros in the Poisson. 
In estimation an econometric issue is endogeneity. Presumably whatever unobserved variables drive 
kabupaten levels of harassment (e.g., unexplained needs for public services) affect also the intensity with 
which the kabupaten bargains for higher property tax targets and central government’s willingness to adjust 
these targets, or to increase monies in the residual transfers category. Thus we should treat the two fiscal 
variables as endogenous. As such we want to define a set of instruments that influence these covariates but are 
exogenous to current kabupaten error drawings. In that case we estimate a moment condition based on a count 
model. If    exp ( ),j j j j jV L L Xλ β≡ − = −  where jX are covariates , is the actual number of licensesjL and 
jλ the expected number, the moment condition is  |  0j jE V Z  =   (Windmeijer and Silva, 1997 and 
Mullahy, 1997), where jZ  are instruments. As in section 2, we face a potential problem of weak instruments. 
After much experimentation we settled on land area as a scale control, the median property tax rate paid by 
manufacturing firms in 1997 as being correlated with tax transfers, and the ratio of first sector GDP (which 
includes natural resources) to all GDP in 1994 as influencing residual transfers. While the use of a 1997 tax 
rate might be “suspicious”, the idea is that rate itself in 1997 is historically based and not driven by 
unobserved public good demand determinants in, say 2000. The variable does survive specification tests (see 
below) and it is a strong instrument for tax transfers with a first stage F – statistic on the instruments of 63. 
However for residual transfers in 1999, while specification tests suggest they are endogenous, first stage F’s 
are just under 5 and the partial 2R is under .05.  
                                                 
11 If all transfers are known for sure, transfer formulae facing kabupaten are the same, and no monies are siphoned off, 
then a simple minded equation for the use of harassment as a function of fiscal gap is *ln( ),b GDP transfersα −  where 
the income elasticity of demand is one. Then we could approximate the relevant parts as 
ln( ) ,  where transfers/GDP.b GDP bratio ratio− =   
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   Basic results are in Table 4. For the number of licenses, the OLS and Poisson coefficients in columns 
(iv) and (i) respectively are fairly close. We focus on the IV results in column (ii), based on the moment 
condition in the non-linear model, where the Poisson distribution assumption no longer need apply and where 
estimates account for heteroskedasticity12. In column (ii), in terms of firm covariates, we see that the number 
of licenses rises with firm size as would be expected—larger firms have more operations, or tasks, requiring 
licensing. Government firms are less harassed, presumably facing less enforcement of regulations. But what 
are of interest are the fiscal variables. 
 As GDP per capita rises, ceteris paribus, the number of licenses rises, with the interpretation that the 
relative demand for public services rises as GDP per capita rises, requiring more harassment to meet revenue 
needs. Demand also rises with population size, although that effect is weaker. As sophistication of local 
officials increases, that reduces the use of licenses, perhaps reflecting a greater aversion to encouraging 
corruption. A one standard deviation (21) increase in this education variable reduces the number of licenses 
by 20%, a substantial effect. This result is of interest in itself, with the idea that with human capital 
accumulation and perhaps the resulting improvement in local institutions, corruption declines. 
Finally we come to the revenue transfer variables and the test of equation (11). In column (ii), the 
ratio of property tax transfers to GDP has a strong, significant negative effect, as does the residual transfer 
variable. A one standard deviation (.00238) increase in the tax transfer variable decreases the number of 
licenses by 73%; while a similar size increase in the residual transfer variable decreases the number of 
licenses by 56%. The IV estimates are completely different from the ordinary Poisson or OLS estimates. The 
effect of instrumenting is to remove the positive correlation from unobserved demand components increasing 
both tax transfers permitted and licenses imposed. Sargan-test statistics are well within the acceptable range, 
and represent an overall test of the model and orthogonality of instruments to the error term.  
Robustness and Other Tests 
How robust are the results? We re-estimated the model using the full sample with zero license 
observations included. There the IV coefficients (and standard errors) for the tax and general transfer 
variables are respectively -354 (87) and -182 (130); the Sargan-test statistic deteriorates modestly with a p-
value of .164. Second as reported in column (iii), we estimated the model replacing our ratio tax and transfer 
to GDP variables by the logs of total property tax transfers and total residual transfers. The Sargan-test 
statistic increases substantially and now is just in the critical range. The new specification has a big effect on 
the income and population variables increasing their elasticities dramatically, with the change in functional 
form. The tax and other transfer variables are now in elasticity form and are negative and significant, with a 
                                                 
12 We use Windmeijer’s EXPEND Gauss program, which he has kindly made available on the IFS website at UCL. 
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stronger effect for tax transfers. Holding income and population fixed if tax transfers double, the number of 
licenses falls by 45%. Finally we experimented with adding other covariates and instruments to the basic 
formulations. Experimentation suggests as long as instruments for the tax variable remain strong, the tax-
transfer coefficient is stable. The residual transfer variable can take smaller absolute values (down to 150− ) 
in different experiments, but again is stable for specifications passing the Sargan test. 
There are other tests of the model one would like to carry out. For example, besides looking at 
harassment or regulation levels we could look through to bribes and see if bribe activity itself varies with the 
fiscal gap. For a bribe equation, as in section 2, IV estimation is more problematic yielding very large 
standard errors. So we have focused on the test where the statistical formulation is more compelling. 13 Second 
one should test whether firms respond, in fact, in making location decisions to harassment. We spent a lot of 
time on that issue. We structured a firm birth model for counts of births of manufacturing firms across 
kabupaten from 1997 to 2000 (the last year available), using the IV approach we used for counts of licenses. 
Unfortunately this time period (base of 1997) is well before our data on harassment in 2001-2002. Thus we 
can’t look at whether harassment affects location decisions; that will require birth data for, say, 2001-2003 
which is not yet available. But we can look at whether effective property tax rates in 1997 across kabupaten as 
reported in the Annual Survey of Medium and Large Size Establishments affects location decisions for 1997-
2000. For firm births, apart from this tax variable (which is also measured with error), variables such as local 
wage rates and own industry external scale economies are endogenous. In IV estimation a one standard 
deviation increase in the tax rate leads to a 29% decline in the number of firms in a kabupaten, a really strong 
effect. However given the larger number of endogenous variables and a problem of less than very strong 
instruments, while the estimate of the coefficient is fairly robust, it is “noisy” with a t-statistic of only 1.20. 
 
4. Summary  
 
Bribes for firms in Indonesia in part arise from the imposition of harassment, principally licenses, 
administered by local government officials. Harassment generates direct revenues (fees) plus indirect 
revenues in the form of bribes, where we argue that the latter will be capitalized into lower salaries needed by 
localities to compensate public officials. Localities in Indonesia are hampered by insufficient revenues from 
                                                 
13 We looked at a reduced form bribe ratio equation where we remove all forms of harassment and ask whether 
unconditioned bribes (except for firm covariates) rise with the fiscal gap. In OLS work, not surprisingly tax and general 
transfer numbers have positive coefficients. The problem with two stage work is that standard errors are simply 
enormous, not surprisingly given section 2 problems with IV estimation. 
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non-harassment sources to pay competitive salaries plus fund “demanded” levels of public services. Effective 
local tax rates are capped at different levels across localities by the center and inter-governmental transfers are 
limited. Thus the direct and indirect revenues from harassment are a central part of local finances.  
In modeling and estimating the relationship between bribes, time spent with local officials, and 
different forms of harassment, or regulation, the paper finds that both bribes and time rise strongly with 
different forms of harassment and that bribes and time are positively correlated. Bribing is a time intensive 
activity. Patterns of non-reporting on different answers suggest some firms bribe their way entirely out of 
paying taxes or, even, securing licenses, but that activity takes a lot of time; and many of inferred big bribers 
seem to refuse to report bribe amounts.  
The paper then models how inter-jurisdictional competition for firms may limit the degree of 
harassment and how greater sources of tax or inter-governmental revenues reduce the need for harassment, 
and help limit corruption. The paper estimates the effect of differential revenue sources on the variation in 
harassment across localities, finding a large reduction in the main form of measurable harassment –licenses-- 
in better funded localities. It also finds that, ceteris paribus, harassment declines with increased education of 
local officials. That would suggest that economic development per se will retard corruption. The findings are 
directly relevant to Indonesia where corruption is high and the country is in the throes of major 
decentralization and local democratization processes.  A key to limiting local corruption, apart from 
appointing better educated officials, may be to either relax caps on local property tax rates or to increase inter-
governmental transfers, so localities have sufficient revenue sources and don’t need to rely on “red tape” and 
corruption to effectively compensate local officials and raise local revenues.  
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Table 1. Bribes Paid 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
   
OLS with 
 
OLS set-up 
 OLS Smoothing Time costs 
    
dummy: no taxes    7.33**   7.12**   6.64** 
 (1.05) (1.09) (1.30) 
    
dummy: no 
licenses 
     3.12**       2.85**     6.22** 
    (1.12)  (1.13)  (1.34) 
    
ln (no. of licenses)   1.20**       .908**   1.80* 
   (.482)   (.462)     (.554) 
    
taxes/costs      .408**       .384**        .249** 
    (.0394)      (.0409)      (.0530) 
    
distance to nearest       .492**       .371*       .183 
  major metro area    (.222)    (.221)    (.353) 
    
“levies are 
obstacles” 
      .766**      .589**      1.00** 
    (.198)    (.211)    (.229) 
    
“new levies 
problem 
      .639**       .569**   -.290 
   since auto. law”    (.235)     (.219)    (.246) 
    
dummy: small-     .768     .754     .661 
  medium firm     (.796)      (.798)    (.663) 
    
dummy: medium-     -2.56**    -2.46** -1.18 
  large firm    (.696)     (.686)      (.862) 
    
dummy: large firm    -4.98**    -5.41**    -1.22 
  (1.07)     (.936)     (1.48) 
    
dummy: service 1.30**        .920** 1.21 
  sector    (.669)    (.685)     (.933) 
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Table 1. Bribes Paid – (Continued) 
   
OLS with 
 
set-up 
 OLS time costs 
dummy: FDI or not    2.21**    1.96*   -1.94* 
 (1.09)  (1.11)  (1.08) 
    
dummy: export or not 1.13  1.39     1.73* 
     (.943)     (.916)       (.913) 
    
dummy: govt. -1.60 -1.26 -1.57 
  shareholding     (.867)      (.849)      (.959) 
    
time spent smoothing --   .121** -- 
  (.0382)  
    
firms predict bribes --   -.531** -- 
  (.241)  
    
firms will receive --   .0737 -- 
  promised favors  (.249)  
    
constant   -3.34**   -1.63       -.991 
 (1.29)   (1.69)    (1.64) 
    
adj. R2    .197 .225     .128 
    
N  1302 1302 1104 
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Table 2. Taxes in Annual Survey of Medium and Large Enterprises 
 
 
 
Value Capital Stock    .002631** 
  (.000172) 
  
controls for ownership yes 
  
N 9784 
  
R2 .0447 
  
 
 
 
 
* Only government ownership is significant with a large positive coefficient. This is the “cash-cow” problem facing firms 
with government ownership – extra “taxes” assessed. 
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Table 3. Time Spent Smoothing 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
  OLS with  
  
OLS 
 
bribes 
Ordered Probit 
    
dummy: no bribes -4.12** -2.29** -.442** 
 (1.08) (1.12) (.117) 
    
dummy: no bribes,    6.92**    6.51**    .667** 
  no taxes (2.12) (2.04) (.156) 
    
dummy: no bribes,    4.98**    4.08*    .470** 
  no licenses (2.23) (2.17) (.155) 
    
dummy: bribes, no    1.91    1.22    .176 
  taxes   (1.32)   (1.34)   (.117) 
    
dummy: bribes, no    1.84    1.67    .164 
  licenses (1.58) (1.63)   (.116) 
    
ln (no. of licenses)    1.76**    1.70**    .175** 
    (.781)    (.786)    (.0444) 
    
distance to nearest       .748**       .626**        .0737** 
  major metro area   (.297)   (.289)    (.0232) 
    
taxes/costs        .129**        .0804        .0121** 
      (.0543)      (.0539)      (.00348) 
    
“levies are obstacles”    1.09**      .999**       .143** 
 (3.72)   (.376)    (.0220) 
    
“new levies problem     .456    .336    .0215 
  since auto. law”    (.383)   (.382)    (.0247) 
    
dummy: small  1.64 1.67   .200** 
  medium firm (1.30) (1.35)     (.0695) 
    
dummy: medium-    -.661    -.358    -.00820 
  large firm (1.14) (1.12)   (.0718) 
    
dummy: large firm      .227   1.03    .0570 
 (1.10) (1.10) (.0909) 
    
dummy: service    2.10**   1.77**    .214** 
  sector    (.912)    (.887)    (.0598) 
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Table 3. Time Spent Smoothing – (Continued) 
 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
    
  OLS with  
  
OLS 
 
bribes 
Ordered Probit 
    
dummy: FDI or not     .977    .429    .0651 
     (.988) (1.04)    (.0879) 
    
dummy: export or not    -.352    -.805    .00695 
     (.748)     (.705)    (.0728) 
    
dummy: govt. share-    -.806    -.469    -.152 
  holding  (1.38)  (1.37)     (.103) 
    
bribes/costs   --    .139** -- 
  (.0463)  
    
firms can predict --  -.782** -- 
  bribes  (.258)  
    
firms receive  --    .460** -- 
  promises and favors  (.275)  
    
constant   1.57   3.11 n.a. 
   (1.58)   (1.89)  
    
R2         .0819        .101  (.0439) 
    
N 1688 1685 1688 
    
 
 
(a) Cut-off points (on 1-6 scale) with standard errors in parentheses are .698 (.122), 1.69 (.126), 2.54 (.132), 3.44 
(.146), and 4.05 (.179). 
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Table 4. Harassment (Licenses) and Fiscal Transfers 
 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
 Number of 
licenses 
Number of 
licenses 
Number of 
licenses 
Ln(number of 
licenses 
 Poisson IV  IV OLS 
     
dummy: small- .153** .128** .124*     .143** 
  medium firm     (.0638)      (.0619) (.0646)    (.0476) 
     
dummy: medium-     .251** .216** .162**    .248** 
  large firm    (.0639)     (.0637) (.0644)     (.0575) 
     
dummy: large firm .371**    .404** .418**    .338** 
 (.100)  (.0915) (.0924)     (.0818) 
     
dummy: service    -.0504 -.0354 .0408        -.0475 
  sector  (.0633)    (.0500) (.0625)    (.0487) 
     
dummy: FDI or not    .0889 .142 .0647    .0655 
 (.112)  (.106) (.103)  (.0904) 
     
dummy: export or 
not 
.111  .105** .179**  -.0825 
     (.0721)     (.0653) (.0652)     (.0566) 
     
dummy: govt. -.157** -.284** -.182** -.114* 
  shareholding     (.0610)    (.0763) (.0697)      (.0684) 
     
ln (GDP pc) .136**     .125** .771** .165** 
 (.0568)      (.0548) (.143) (.0470) 
     
ln (population) .172** .0478 .783** .122* 
 (.0747) (.0378) (.215) (.0658) 
     
% village heads -.00864**        -.0096** -.0091** -.00741** 
with high school (.00219)   (.0016) (.0013) (.00217) 
 --    
residual trans./GDP  -.481    -237** [-.452**] 3.35 
[ln(res. trans.)] (7.16)   (105) [(.149)] (4.94) 
     
prop. tax trans/GDP  -23.4 -306** [-.144**]   -21.4 
[ln(prop. taxes )] (16.6) (81.1) [(.0284)] (13.3) 
     
constant   -.324    2.51** -4.85** .0587 
 (.988)   (.591) (1.75)   (.843) 
     
Sargan (p-value)     n.a.    1.23 (.267) 3.20 (.0737) [.169] 
[ 2R ]     
N  1422 1422 1422 1422 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Bribe to Cost Percents (12 equal length cells) 
 
 
